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1 The expressions “civil society” as well as that one of “colour revolutions” refer to a
diversity of possible meaning that will be discussed later on.
2 According to the Development Assistance Committee database, the OECD countries’
total aid targeting Civil Society has constantly grown since 2000. In 2005, the Govern -
ment and Civil Society sector represented 9,324.28 millions of dollars or more than
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Abstract
Der Bei trag unter sucht  den Pro zess aus län di scher
Unter stüt zung  für  die Zivil ge sell schaf ten  in  den  post
- sow je ti schen Staa ten  und  die  damit ver bun de nen
Impli ka tio nen  unter beson de rer Berück sich ti gung
der „far bi gen Revo lu tio nen.“  In Ser bi en (2000), Geor -
gi en (2003),  der Ukrai ne (2004)  und Kir gi sistan
(2005)  wird all ge mein  die Rol le  der Nicht re gie rungs-
und  der Jugend or ga ni sa tio nen  beim Orga ni sie ren
gesell schaft li chen Pro tests  als  das eigent li che, kri ti -
sche Ele ment wäh rend  der „far bi gen Revo lu tio nen“
ange se hen.  Im Gegen satz  zu ver brei te ten Auf fas sun -
gen  wird  die The se ver tre ten,  dass die se „Revo lu tio -
nen“ kei ne direk te Kon se quenz  der gewach se nen
exter nen Unter stüt zung  für  die Zivil ge sell schaf ten
waren. Statt des sen  wird  den gesell schaft li chen Bewe -
gun gen eine Schlüs sel rol le inner halb  der „far bi gen
Revo lu tio nen“ zuge schrie ben. Die se ver war fen  das
west li che  Modell rigi der, hie rar chisch struk tu rier ter
Orga ni sa ti on zuguns ten deut lich fle xib ler struk tu -
rier ter „rhi zo mi scher“, trans na tio na ler For men. 
Considering recent cases of authoritarian consolidation all over the world ( Uz -
bekistan, Belarus, Burma, Zimbabwe ), the international call for increased aid to
support human rights’ defenders, to bypass authoritarian governments in the
implementation of development projects, and to improve the working conditions
of non - governmental organizations presumes that a strong “civil society”1 pro-
motes development through democratization. This presumption lies behind
most of the millions of dollars that international agencies and bilateral donors
have spent on official aid to strengthening civil societies of developing and / or
authoritarian countries.2 Since the mid - 1990s, the failures of methods based on
inter - State relations ( top - down ) have progressively made international donors
amend their strategies and programs of democratization toward more “grass -
rooted” methods aiming less at imposing democracy than at favoring a social
hybridizing of democratic norms and procedures.
However, the effectiveness of the current design of civil society support pro-
grams remains a highly controversial issue for academics and development prac-
titioners, who have debated over it ever since NGOs first appeared as recipients
of official aid.3 From both sides of the political spectrum, attacks on the effec-
tiveness of civil society support related to democratization have become a grow-
ing industry for development’s experts : the bottom - up paradigm is criticized
either for its inability to spread democratic values worldwide and for its neo -
colonial bias.4 Some critics also point to inappropriate management of grants
and selection of recipients, to bad or useless projects funded by aid. Others focus
on aid granted to NGOs actually linked with “bad” governments, usually infer-
ring this is the rule and not the exception.5 Moreover, recent backlashes against
Civil Society Organizations ( CSO ) would be symbols of persistent forms of
authoritarianism as well as evidences of the incapacity of social movements to
fight successfully against autocratic regimes. Criticized for their lack of sustain-
ability and for their vulnerability to State repression, Civil Society Organizations
would be no more than the gadgets of their financial supporters and thus unable
to launch effective, autonomous and spontaneous pro - democratic actions. This
paper argues for a more comprehensive analysis taking into account both the
appropriation of the civil society rhetoric by authoritarian governments and the
ability of social actors to exploit it to develop indigenous forms of political dissent. 
The recent phenomenon of colour revolutions supposes to have a second
glance at these critics. In 1994, Larry Diamond assessed the contribution of civil
society to transition processes.6 He regarded as weak the role civil society plays
in transition periods whereas a strong civil society would be critical in demo-
cratic consolidation. Contrary to this analysis suggesting that the implication of
CSO would be extremely limited in the phase of regime change, recent colour
revolutions are largely seen as counterexamples to such predictions : From
Serbia to Kyrgyzstan, from Otpor to Kel - Kel, CSO and youth organizations seem
to have played a great role in social mobilizations that have led to the political
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10 % of the total bilateral aid ( source : DAC5 Official Bilateral commitments by sector.
OECD.stat ). 
3 Abramson wrote already in 1999 that NGO and development bashing is somewhat in
vogue, especially among anthropologists who are not getting their bread and butter
directly from development or aid organizations. Cf. David M. Abramson, A Critical
Look at NGOs and Civil Society as Means to an End in Uzbekistan. In : Human
Organi zation, 58 (1999) 3, pp. 240–250, here 242. 
4 Cf. Jude Howell, In their own image : Donor assistance to civil society. In : Lusotopie, 1
(2002), pp. 117–131. 
5 Cf. Abramson, A Critical Look at NGOs.
6 Cf. Larry Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society. In : Journal of Democracy, 3 (1994), pp.
4–17. 
transformation of Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and
Kyrgyzstan (2005). Even the strong repression of popular movements and social
mobilization in Belarus (2005), Azerbaijan (2005), Uzbekistan (2005) and
Burma (2007) are seen as encouraging cases of civil actions aimed at overthrow-
ing the state or changing its policy. The colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine
and the Kyrgyz Republic would have thus demonstrated the effectiveness of
external programs aiming at strengthening civil society and carried on before
these political changes. As soon as external actors shift their programs from
State actors toward CSO, democracy would then appear as a realistic, achievable
and legitimate objective. 
The passage from a “transition paradigm” to the “civil society formula” is not
only a change of scale. Following the works of Jean - François Bayart, the social
practices related to the diffusion of the rhetoric of civil society and the particular
social background that Civil Society Organizations constitute ought to be ana-
lyzed as such7 and beyond the role they can play in the process of democratiza-
tion : Who are their members ? What are their motivations ? What effects does
the external intervention in closed regimes produce on the social field, on the
repertories of collective action and on the expression of political dissent ? Almost
10 years after the “end of the transition paradigm”,8 is the civil society approach
now over ? Were colour revolutions direct consequences of the intensification of
external civil society support ?
This article is based both on field research conducted in Central Asia9 and an
extensive review of literature dealing with colour revolutions’ dynamics, social
movements’ theory and democratization studies. Its aim is less to present
exhaustive descriptions of colour revolutions than to lay the foundations for fur-
ther researches on foreign intervention, social mobilization and regime change.
In picking colour revolutions as a case study, this paper targets the process ( and
its implications ) of international support to so - called civil societies movements.
Although it is commonly conceived as a domestic process, colour revolutions
ought to be conceived in a global perspective and as a transnational process.
Thus, this paper will also argue for an extension of the theoretical and geograph-
ical scope generally used to analyze democratization processes.
Our analysis will require multiple points of view on the social practices of civil
society : actors “inside” this category, allied or antagonistic actors of civil soci-
eties and external promoters of the civil society formula. We will argue that inter-
national donors’ involvement in colour revolutions through the use of the civil
society formula has had two major and paradoxical implications. On the one
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7 Cf. Jean - François Bayart, La revanche des sociétés africaines. In : Le politique par le
bas en Afrique noire. Contributions à une problématique de la démocratie, Paris 1992. 
8 Cf. Thomas Carothers, The end of the transition paradigm. In : Journal of Democracy,
13 (2002), 1, pp. 5–21. 
9 This article is mainly based on information gathered during various journeys in
Central Asia from 2002 to 2006 and during a three - month internship at the Budapest
headquarters of the Open Society Institute ( Summer 2006).
hand, international support to civil society has largely contributed to the depo-
larization of political dissent nationwide. On the other hand, it has made possi-
ble the rejection of rigid and hierarchical organizations in favor of new forms of
dissent movements. The limited scope and the fragile existence of the third sec-
tor are both consequences of the repressive measures taken by the local authori-
ties and the specific patterns of international support to civil society. But, at the
same time, such a weakness seems to be one of the critical elements for political
action and democratic invention. 
I. Civil society aid and democratization : preliminary precautions
It is quite unsurprising that many researchers have found the relationship
between civil society aid and actual democratization to be weak. Evidence sug-
gests a high level of heterogeneity in the effects of aid, which comes on top of the
typical problems that arise in cross - country analysis. Multiple markers for demo-
cratic success – elections, human rights’ record, non - discriminatory access to
public positions – further complicate empirical research. As for democracy assis-
tance as a whole, some argue that civil society aid has not prevented growing
numbers of hybrid regimes worldwide; others argue that the situation would be
far worse without it.10 Although these findings may make civil society aid less
and less defensible, much of the criticism is misguided. This isn't to say the
impact of aid is easily known or that we can fine - tune aid to improve results. But
the civil society formula as a whole cannot be globally discredited. Assessing the
bottom - up approach of democratization should go through a subtle process of
deconstruction : the civil society formula has been linked up with many historical
and normative elements, which cannot be taken for granted.
First, critics of civil society aid arise in a broader context where both the com-
mitment and the capacity of external actors to promote democracy abroad are
put into question. Since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion and pro-
tection of human rights have constituted the core of the American, and, to a
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10 In their recent Journal of Democracy article ( Edward D. Mansfield, Jack L. Snyder,
The Sequencing “Fallacy”. In : Journal of Democracy, 18 (2007) 3, pp. 5–10), Edward
Mansfield and Jack Snyder emphasize the costs of failed democratizations. They argue
that premature, out - of - sequence democracy assistance programs toward authoritarian
countries may make later efforts to democratize them more difficult than they would
otherwise be. According to them, democratizing in the wrong sequence not only risks
bloodshed in the short term, but can also nurture the mobilization of illiberal forces
with the capacity to block democratic consolidation over the long term. Thomas
Carothers responded to their analysis in an article entitled “How Democracies
Emerge: The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy” ( In : Journal of Democracy, 18 (2007) 1, pp.
12–27). Explor ing cases from South America to Africa and Middle East, Carothers
claims that democratic struggle against authoritarianism is actually compatible with
rule - of - law development and state - building. 
lesser extent, the European foreign policy discourses. But, beyond this rhetoric,
the importance of Western democracy promotion and especially American for-
eign policy is rather limited.11 According to Thomas Carothers, despite its grow-
ing references to the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has
significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts by increasing the num-
ber of close ties with “friendly tyrants”. Security interests and U.S. energy needs
have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations
with more than half of the forty - five “non - free” countries in the world.12
Moreover, the pessimistic assessment of the U.S. willingness and capacity to pro-
mote democracy overseas appears as a result of a broader reaction to its enthusi-
asm about democracy promotion13 that has emerged since the second half of the
1990s.14 Believing that the global democratic wave was over and largely over-
rated, several scholars articulated a pessimistic and cautionary view on democra-
tization. Fareed Zakaria, alarmed by the recent elections of leaders restricting
rights and abusing power, thought that rapid democratization could lead to
“illiberal democracy”.15 Considering the new conflicts breaking out in countries
in transition, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argued that democratizing
states lead more to conflict situations than stable regimes.16 Worried by the con-
flict - prone nature of transition, Amy Chua concluded that promoting both dem-
ocratic practices and market reforms in countries with “market - dominant
minorities” leads both to ethnic conflict and illiberal backlashes.17 Often arguing
to respect local forms of civility and autochthonous informal relations, other
scholars tend to reject the even concept of democracy promotion assessed as a
new form of colonialism.18 As Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik summarize it,
this last point highlights the “more general question of whether democracy can
be in fact promoted effectively by external actors.”19 Experts on democratic tran-
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11 Cf. Valerie Bunce / Sharon Wolchik, Bringing Down Dictators : American Democracy
Promotion and Electoral Revolutions. In : Postcommunist Eurasia, Working Paper
Series n 5–07, Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, July 2007. 
12 Cf. Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, Washing -
ton D.C. 2007. 
13 Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, Norman/London 1991. 
14 Cf. Carothers, The sequencing fallacy, pp. 12–27. 
15 Cf. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. In : Foreign Affairs, November
1997, pp. 22–43; Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom : Illiberal Democracy at
Home and Abroad, New York 2003. 
16 Cf. Edward Mansfield / Jack Snyder, Democratization and War. In : Foreign Affairs,
May / June 1995, pp. 79–97. 
17 Amy Chua, World On Fire : How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic
Hatred and Global Instability, New York 2003. 
18 Bertrand Badie, L’Etat importé. L’occidentalisation de l’ordre politique, Paris, Novem -
ber 1992; Nicolas Guilhot, The democracy makers – human rights and the politics of
global order, New York 2005. 
19 Cf. Bunce / Wolchik, Bringing Down Dictators, p. 1. 
sitions often assess that democratization is in essence a domestic process :20
“external actors usually lack the knowledge, the stakes, the long term commit-
ment, and the control over the levers of change that are essential for transform-
ing long - lived dictatorships into democratic polities.”21 As I have argued else-
where,22 external interventions in support of democracy and bottom - up
programs of democratization can have adverse effects that undermine effective
democratic development. They can exacerbate local inequalities in favoring an
urban - based, highly educated elite and thereby increase internal resentments of
both the beneficiaries of Western assistance and their foreign patrons.23 They
can fuel dependency relations and undermine the sustainability of local Civil
Society Organizations ( CSOs ).24 Finally, they can distort domestic politics by
making CSOs to focus on the current “hot issues” of the international donors’
community and to prevent domestic questions from emerging.25
Second, civil society is a heterogeneous concept, made up of three different
dimensions, which have to be distinguished. The bottom - up paradigm of democ-
ratization merges an analytical tool ( civil society, as a scientific category, is a
means to understand political changes ), a political instrument ( Civil Society
Organizations foster democratization of closed regimes ) and a normative bias
(both civil society as a concept and CSOs ought to be promoted for the sake of
political societies ).26 According to most development agencies and private
donors,27 civil society comprises the various associations located in a distinct
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20 Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Spreading Democracy. In : Foreign Policy, September / October
2004. 
21 Bunce /Wolchik, Bringing Down Dictators, p. 2. 
22 Cf. Simon Tordjman, Démocrates sans démocratie : Soutien à la société civile et démo-
cratisation en Ouzbékistan post - soviétique. In : Sens public, Octobre 2007.
23 Ase Grodeland, “‘It really strikes me as suspicious when people buy a jeep or a luxuri-
ous car and drive around in it after two or three successful projects’ : Public
Perceptions of Non - Governmental Organizations in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Mace do nia”, Unpublished manuscript 2005.
24 Jude Howell / Jenny Pearce, Civil Society and Development, a critical exploration,
London 2001. 
25 See, among others : Sarah Henderson, Selling Civil Society : Western Aid and the Non -
Governmental Organizations Sector in Russia. In : Comparative Political Studies, 35
(March 2002), pp. 136–167; Sada Aksartova, NGO Diffusion in the Former Soviet
Union and its Effects. In : Civil Society from Abroad : U.S. Donors in the Former Soviet
Union, PhD. dissertation, Princeton University 2005; Sarah Mendelson / John Glenn
(eds.), The Power and Limits of NGOs : A Critical Look at Building Democracy in
Eastern Europe and Eurasia, New York 2002. 
26 Cf. Michel Camau, Sociétés civiles réelles et téléologie de la démocratisation. In :
Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, 9 (2002) 2, pp. 213–232. See also
Krishna Kumra ( ed.), Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International
Assistance, Colorado / London 1998. 
27 Due to editorial constraints, I cannot include here all the definitions of civil society
given by international donors and development agencies. However, a few of them need
to be quoted here : The report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations
Relations to Civil Society refers to civil society as an association of citizens ( outside
their families, friends and businesses ) entered into voluntarily to advance their inter-
space, which is neither the State, nor the market. However, this “third sector”
would show similarities with these two spheres : like the State, it is made up of
organizations, and as with the market, it is defined by the voluntary and active
participation of its members. Civil society aid is based on the idea that the more
the third sphere would be dense and inclusive, the more civil society would be
strengthened and democracy would consolidate. In implementing the concept of
civil society, democracy promotion programs conceive civil society as a prag-
matic tool and a normative goal : it is at once the objective and the instrument to
achieve it. Consequently, the study of the concept of civil society cannot be disso-
ciated from the analysis of its realization.28 The bottom - up paradigm of democ-
ratization can then be understood as an “action on actions”, to recall the terms
employed by Michel Foucault to define the concept of governmentality: “It is an
action on possible actions : it plays on the field of possibility where subjects act :
it encourages, it induces, it diverts, it facilitates or makes more difficult, it widens
or it limits, it makes more or less probable; it can even constrain or prevent
absolutely; it is always a way of working on one or several subjects, when they
are actually acting or as soon as they are likely to act.”29
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ests, ideas and ideologies. The term does not include profit - making activity ( the private
sector ) or governing ( the public sector ); cf. We the peoples : civil society, the United
Nations and global governance. Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United
Nations–Civil Society Relations, A /58/817, 11 June 2004. The World Bank regards
civil society as “the groups and organizations, both formal and informal, which act
independently of the state and market to promote diverse interests in society”; cf.
World Bank, http ://www.worldbank.org, last accessed November 2007. According to
the DFID ( UK Department of International Development ), “civil society” corresponds
to “arenas of associational life located between the state and the family or household,
where society debates and negotiates matters of common concern and organizes to
regulate public affairs”; cf. DFID, How to work with civil society to support country
strategy objectives, London 2002. According to Charles Taylor, civil society is a web of
autonomous associations independent of the state, which bind citizens together in mat-
ters of common concern, and by their existence or actions could have an effect on pub-
lic policy; cf. Gail Kligman, Reclaiming the public : a reflection on recreating civil soci-
ety in Romania. In : Eastern European Politics and Societies, 4 (1990) 3, pp. 393–438,
here 420. Schmitter defines civil society as [ a ] set or system of self - organized interme-
diary groups; cf. Philippe Schmitter, On Civil Society and the Consolidation of Demo -
cracy : Ten Propositions, July 1995, p. 1. The inclusion of the private sector within civil
society remains highly debated. Although the Concise Oxford dictionary of Politics
defines civil society as the set of intermediate associations that are neither the state nor
the ( extended ) family [ civil society therefore includes voluntary associations and firms
and other corporate bodies ], other scholars insist on the non - lucrative nature of Civil
Society Organizations; cf. Thomas Carothers, Think Again Civil Society. In : Foreign
Policy, No. 117, Winter 1999–2000, pp. 18–29. 
28 See Jeffrey Alexander, Civil Society I, II, III : Constructing an Empirical Concept from
Normative Controversies and Historical Transformations. In : Jeffrey Alexander ( ed.),
Real civil societies. Dilemmas of Institutionalization, London 1998. 
29 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité, tome 1 : La Volonté de savoir, Paris 1976,
p. 105 ( Translation by the author ) : un ensemble d’action sur des actions possibles : il
opère sur le champ de possibilité où vient s’inscrire le comportement de sujets agis-
sants : il incite, il induit, il détourne, il facilite ou rend plus difficile, il élargit ou il limite,
Third, the civil society formula unquestionably provides ample fodder for crit-
ics : many cases exist of civil society projects poorly conceived, badly executed, or
unsustainable. The term of civil society is vague enough to become a common
reference to both liberal democracies and authoritarian ( or hybrid ) regimes :
some badly managed organizations and / or government - oriented organizations
(GONGOs ) may have, indeed, received high amounts of funding. International
donors have progressively substituted the civil society formula with the “transi-
tion paradigm”, but, once the latter proved misguided ( recall the huge number
of fake elections that have brought real autocrats into power in the 1990s ), the
bottom - up paradigm should now be discredited. However, this does not prove
that all civil society programs have been, or are, ineffective. 
II. The diffusion of a new democratization paradigm : 
the “civil society” formula
In 1959, Seymour Lipset wrote a seminal article regarding development as a pre-
condition to democracy.30 However, since the beginning of the 1990s, interna-
tional assistance explicitly and exclusively targeting the latter has represented a
growing part of international aid.31 Democracy has been considered either as a
goal in itself, or as the main guarantee for local populations to effectively get the
benefits of the international aid. By way of consequence, as soon as democracy is
effective, disfavored populations would be both the best means to manage assis-
tance funds effectively and the final recipient of them. Democracy is then prefer-
able, not because it is better in itself but because it would guarantee the effective-
ness of development by involving the populations into its process. Consequently,
the realization of civil societies, which would favor both development and
democracy, would meet the two main objectives of international donors.
In embracing and realizing the concept of civil society, development agencies
partly show their disillusionment with respect to the State and to its effectiveness
as an actor of development. Lack of accountability and legitimacy, corruption
and mismanagement of national budgets have been progressively regarded as
the main features of many States in the South and as fundamental obstacles to
their development.32 As Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce summarizes it during the
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il rend plus ou moins probable; à la limite, il contraint ou empêche absolument; mais il
est bien toujours une manière d’agir sur un ou sur des sujets agissants, et ce tant qu’ils
agissent ou sont susceptibles d’agir. 
30 See Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy : Economic Develop -
ment and Political Legitimacy. In : American Political Science Review, 53 (1959) 1,
pp. 69–105. 
31 Cf. Thomas Carothers, Democracy assistance : The Question of Strategy. In : Democra -
tization, 4 (1997) 3, pp. 109–132. 
32 Cf. Howell, In their own image. 
1990s, “the State [...] started to be perceived as part of the problem, and not of
the solution.”33 Consequently, the civil society formula is a means of solving the
serious difficulties met by the programs of development and a tool of political
resistance against authoritarianism. According to Joseph Stiglitz, since top - down
approaches failed to effectively promote development and democratization,
“civil society in general and NGOs in particular, were to assume a new role, not
replacing the state but holding it accountable so that it served the interests of
society, a role summed up in the term ‘advocacy’.”34 The shift from a State - cen-
tered approach to this bottom - up method “meant that local people were no
longer seen as passive beneficiaries; the idea that the State had the key to solu-
tions was replaced by recognition of the knowledge of local people.
Consequently, the role of development professionals also changed; they tend to
be seen less as controllers and more as facilitators.”35 That is not to say that top-
down measures, political conditionality and sanctions have totally and definitely
disappeared but they are no more the only ways to promote both development
and democracy abroad.
Civil societies are double - faced : they both embody the right of all people to
self - determination and favor a greater involvement of local populations in their
own development ( empowerment ). Since the 1990s, the civil society formula has
been a way to merge a political strategy with ( civil society is a basis for political
resistance in “closed societies”36) “economic” advantages.37 Since civil society
stands in between the State and the individual, strong civil societies would pro-
tect and preserve what is necessary to liberal democratic societies : both the
autonomy of individuals and the sense of “collective consciousness” which is
necessary to foster economic relations between agents.38 One can then distin-
guish a liberal conception from an ultra - liberal view on civil society : Although
the former regards civil society as a means to strengthen State accountability, the
latter considers civil society as a way to fight against the excessive power of State. 
Seeking to address the issue of bad governance in weak or corrupted States,
foreign donors have increasingly considered NGOs as key elements of civil soci-
ety. According to Ottaway and Carothers, “donors’ tendency to think of NGOs
as the heart of civil society is part and parcel of their ahistorical approach to this
domain. When Western democracy promoters embraced the notion of civil soci-
Tordjman, “Surfing the wave” 51
33 Howell / Pearce, Civil Society and Development, p. 14.
34 Joseph E. Stilgitz, Participation and Development : Perspectives from the Comprehen -
sive Development Paradigm. In : Review of Development Economics, 6 (2002) 2, pp.
163–182, here 163. 
35 See Dennis Dijkzeul, Programs and the problems of participation. In : Idem / Yves
Beigbeder, Rethinking International Organizations. Pathology & Promise, Oxford /
New York 2003. 
36 Cf. Karl Popper, The open society and its enemies (1945), 12th ed., London 1977. 
37 Cf. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,
New York 1990. 
38 Cf. Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civility : Selected Essays on Liberalism, Tradition, and
Civil Society, Indianapolis 1997. 
ety aid in the early 1990s, they often assumed that since the countries in which
they were working had few organizations of the type donors designate ‘civil soci-
ety organizations’ – that is, Westernized advocacy NGOs – they had little civil
society of any kind.”39 NGOs largely benefit from what are supposed to be their
undeniable advantages : adaptability, flexibility and then efficiency on the
ground.40 Asked the question of whether NGOs constitute “sustainable civil
society or service delivery agencies”,41 foreign donors generally answer both.
Civil society ought to be realized because it is not only an interface between State
and citizens but also a service provider and a way of stimulating the involvement
of citizens in the public sphere. By identifying the needs of local populations and
managing international resources more efficiently, Civil Society Organizations
would foster “social capital”, which, according to Robert Putnam, “refers to con-
nections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely relat -
ed to what some have called ‘civic virtue’.”42
Strong civil societies would then promote civic virtue but would do it without
engaging high financial costs.43 James Scott highlights the fact that the success of
such projects is not indexed on their financial amount.44 On average, the
amount of grants dedicated to civil society is distinctively low ( often less than
$ 5 000 per year ). But civil society assistance consists less in carrying out huge
and expensive initiatives than to multiply small and exemplary projects at low
cost. Contrary to other sectors of international aid like infrastructures or public
facilities building, the effects of civil society support cannot be evaluated in the
short term.
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III. The implementation of the “civil society formula” in  
post - communist countries
Apart from being diffused and integrated in all donors’ discourses and institu-
tional organizations, the civil society formula has largely been implemented in
post - Soviet countries whose hybrid political regimes have merged democratic
and authoritarian elements.45 Both on a per - capita or per - state basis, post -
Soviet countries have been the largest recipients of U.S. democracy assistance
programs.46 Since the mid - 1990s, Georgia has been the second recipient of U.S.
aid after Israel, and Ukraine has not ranked very far behind.47 In Ukraine, since
2001, USAID civil society support has remained constantly high from 4.2 million
dollars in 2001 to 3 million in 2006.48 By comparison, in full dictatorships such
as Uzbekistan or Burma, due to the harsh repression implemented by the local
authorities and the apparent dead - ends of civil society support in terms of the
country’s democratization, the total amount of civil society aid has remained low
( Burma )49 or drastically collapsed ( Uzbekistan ).50
Foreign involvement in democracy promotion has taken diverse forms rang-
ing from promotion of electoral processes to public criticisms of violations of
civil liberties and political rights and aggressive actions. As far as civil society
support in the post - communist region is concerned, international donors has
designed it as a sequential process. Strengthening emerging civil societies has
first supposed to build the organizational and juridical basis of the third sector.
External democracy promoters have then focused on financial support to CSOs
through capacity - building grants. The main domains in which NGOs are active
include civic education, media assistance and defense of human rights. 
Relationships between NGOs and civil society seem at once over - theorized
and a blurry issue. Even if foreign diplomats and donors highlight that NGOs do
not embody the entire sphere of civil society, at the same time, they concede
their tendency to work quasi - exclusively with them. The limits of civil society are
not clear; boundaries move, categories get tangled, while the definition of an
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NGO is vague and encompasses different types of organizations. Thus, when
addressing the issue of CSOs, one needs to distinguish between different types of
organizations involved in external civil society aid. 
Table 1 : Typology of Civil Society Organizations in the Post - Communist Area
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Type of NGO/CSO Goal Source of funding
Issue-Based Organization
(IBO)
Advance a certain “glo-
bal” cause (environmen-
tal, religious, cultural …)
Primarily international
donors or the State and
secondarily membership
fees
Community-Based
Organization (CBO)
Advance the interests of a
geographically delimited
community (inclusive of
all residents)
Primarily international
donors or the State and
secondarily membership
fees
Membership-Based
Organization (MBO)
Advance the interests of
members often defined by
a certain profession or
social status but not neces-
sarily inclusive of all per-
sons in such a category
(i.e. farmers’ association,
youth organization, invalid
society …).
Primarily Membership
fees and secondarily inter-
national donors and the
State
NGO Support
Organization (NGOSO)
Support NGO in their
activities. 
Quasi-exclusively interna-
tional donors or the State
Source : Daniel Stevens, Conceptual travels along the silk road : On civil society aid in Uzbe -
kistan, unpublished PhD Thesis, London 2004, p. 126.
The above typology is derived from the classification Uphoff made for devel-
opment NGOs.51 As soon as civil society is targeted as such, one needs to specify
the notion of Civil Society Organizations and to distinguish between CBOs and
MBOs. Focusing on the different sources of funding of these organizations raises
the question of their own accountability. Strengthening State accountability and
people empowerment have constituted the main objectives of the democracy
promotion programs but, ultimately, those who fund an organization are the
ones to which it is accountable. In the case of an MBO, funded primarily by
membership fees, accountability is to its members. As far as CBOs, IBOs and
NGOSOs are concerned, accountability is to the donor or State agency, which
funds the organization. Although international donors aim to foster State ac -
countability toward national citizens, the creation of NGOs mainly strengthens
their accountability towards international donors. In former Soviet Union, IBOs
have been the most important recipients of external aid. In Eurasia and to a less
important degree in Central and Eastern Europe, development agencies support
local NGOs in order to produce strong civil societies but, at the same time, they
tend to usurp their role in sending, for example, foreign consultants to help and
intervene in domestic matters ( constitutional issues, the legislative process,
NGO management ...).52
Depending on the country, civil societies in former Soviet countries have been
designed as a global break involving three dimensions : an exit from traditional
solidarities, a fight against corruption and bad governance,53 and a rupture with
the former Soviet organization. According to Daan van der Schriek, analyst for
the International Crisis Group, “democratization can be built on the Soviet
legacy. But it does require a break, provided for by an exceptional and commit-
ted leadership intent on de - Sovietizing the state.”54 Civil society would be then
less defined as a vector of democratization than by its opposition to “uncivil”
practices and actors.55 As far as politics is concerned, interactions among citi-
zens depend on two variables : the kind of solidarity between them and their
degree of ideological polarization. In his first major work, The Division of Labor
in Society, Emile Durkheim distinguishes two kinds of social integration : “me -
chanical solidarity” and “organic solidarity”. The former applies to societies in
which all members have common and shared social experiences, and each indi-
vidual is directly and equally attached to the society. Organic solidarity refers to
a system in which increasing division of labor makes social cohesion based upon
the dependence individuals have on each other. Ideological polarization refers to
the degree in which individual or collective actors express normative concep-
tions of political and social life. Explicitly or not, in realizing civil societies, inter-
national donors promote relationships that should correspond to the character-
istics of organic solidarity. Thus, according to Ernest Gellner, civil society is a
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strictly voluntary sphere opposed to ethnic or religious associations and located
between the family and the state.56 Civil society is then incompatible with cor-
ruption, which merged political elites and traditional networks during the Soviet
time.57 Moreover, external democracy promoters often refuse to support partic-
ular political or religious views. Excepting political foundations such as the
National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute or the Ger -
man Partei - Stiftungen, foreign donors generally do not finance political parties
and avoid committing themselves to religious organizations. In the former Soviet
Eurasia and to a less extent in Central and Eastern Europe civil societies are sep-
arated from “traditional society” ( mechanical solidarity and ideological neutral-
ity ), from “religious spheres” ( mechanical solidarity and ideologically oriented )
and from “political society” ( strong ideological commitment and organic solidar-
ity among members ). As Thomas Carothers summarizes it, “much democracy
assistance is overly formal and suffers from a disconnection to the local context.
Yet when donors attempt explicitly to take account of the real power relations
and interests in a particular context, the aid [ causes ] aid officials themselves to
question the appropriateness of their own role.”58 In all colour revolutions, civil
societies encompassed various types of associations and adopted different strate-
gies. However, their “societal localization” tends to remain the same as the one
described above : Too politically engaged59 or too exclusive, religious groups,
political parties and to a lesser extent neighborhood committees are excluded
from the list of potential beneficiaries.
The role of NGOs and student activists in organizing creative nonviolent
resistance is commonly assessed as the critical common feature among colour
revolutions. During the pre - revolutionary period, youth NGOs were the domi-
nant forms of civil societies in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In all
these post - communist countries, most members of NGOs were under 35 and,
according to Kuzio, “in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004),
democratic revolutions [...] would not have taken place without the energy of
young people” :60 Serbia’s Otpor, Georgia’s Kmara, Ukraine’s Pora and
Kyrgyzstan’s Kel - Kel, which are assumed to have played a central role in colour
revolutions, all expressed their desire to break with older generations, old politi-
cian and often corruption - related practices. In all these democratic revolutions,
activists adopt ed strategies and discourses highlighting the necessity of change :
The Georgian opposition group named itself “Enough !” ( Kmara ); in the
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Ukrainian Orange Revolution, the movement worked under the slogan Pora
(“It’s Time”); in Kyrgyzstan, the youth group’s name Kel - Kel means “renais-
sance”; in Belarus, opposition forces launched a protest campaign under the
motto Hopits (“enough” ). On the one hand, these names largely reflect the
“sense of urgen cy”61 and the necessity to break with old politicians’ practices
and corruption. On the other hand, they do not promote an alternative concep-
tion of society. They insist on the need of change but they remain “evasive about
where the crux of the old regime’s unacceptability lies and about the precise
objective of change.”62
Revolution can be defined in two ways : 1) a rapid and often violent change of
discredited political authorities, 2) an attempt to seize the state apparatus to
implement wide - ranging social and political changes. Colour revolutions how-
ever do not correspond to any of these characteristics : in depolarizing politics
and atomizing the social sphere, the civil society formula would have only con-
trib uted to “sterilize” political contention63 and to develop standardized conten -
tious actions. 
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Figure 1 : Civil society and societal divisions
IV. Colour revolutions : from antipolitics to apolitics
Colour revolutions embody an explosive paradox. Their apparent success ( for-
mer leaders were all made to retreat from power ) seems in opposition to the
depolarization of contentious action furthered by the diffusion and the imple-
mentation of the civil society formula. In Eastern Europe, the term “civil society”
arose out of the failure of the Prague spring and the loss of faith that the over-
throw of the regime could occur. Drawing from this disillusion, the idea emerged
that instead of trying to change the state, it was important to change the relation-
ship between state and society by creating self - organized institutions, independ-
ent of the state but aiming to challenge the reach of the state.64
The idea of “antipolitics”, developed by Konrad in 1984, aimed to provide an
alternative to the over - politicization of life under communism in which the omni -
presence of the Soviet power in the public sphere had resulted in the general dis-
trust of politics.65 According to Konrad and Havel, civil society must operate
within the boundaries of the existing system rather than attempt to usurp it.66
But this principle has not been designed as a way to legitimize passivity. Civil
society was conceived as something inherently positive comprising a normative,
rather than simply an empirical or descriptive, meaning.67 The core revolution
the principle of “antipolitics” intended to encapsulate was that of individual con-
sciousness : an “existential revolution.”68
As I argued earlier, civil societies have been rather designed as technical
instruments than defined by ethical positions. From the Central - European
 dissent movements in the 1980s to the recent diffusion of the bottom - up ap -
proaches of development and democratization, civil society – both as norm and
instrument – has shifted from antipolitics to an apolitical posture. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, political dissent has largely been expressed in ideological
terms and focused on the possible forms of political change after the end of com-
munism. In colour revolutions, which were focused on the questions of corrup-
tion and electoral fraud, the question became a more technical one : how to im -
prove self - rule and achieve good governance in a country ? In equating civil
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society support with the strengthening of non - governmental sectors, external
donors have progressively disconnected the notion of civil society from the
whole revolutionary tradition based and “unconstitutional and often violent
paths to power.”69 Elaborating on Fairbanks, one can argue that external donors
“concentrate[ d ] [...] on building a decent, non - ideological ‘civil society’ [...] in
which men could live more freely”70 without using any violent or unconstitu-
tional ways. Thus, civil societies would be incompatible with any revolutionary
movement. Besides, the word “revolution” has rarely been used as such by local
democracy activists. From the Georgian “rose revolution” to the Burmese “saf-
fron revolution”, it was applied either by friendly foreign analysts or journalists,
or conservative forces intending to discredit the emerging movements. 
Revolutionary processes have been traditionally analyzed as domestic move-
ments bringing down the old political order and arguing for a quick ( and violent)
change of the dominant group to the benefit of the whole community. Although
one cannot presume that there is an unchanging formula that would guaranty
the success of such revolutions,71 all colour revolutions seem relatively analo-
gous, as far as their conditions and their characteristics are concerned. First,
they have usually occurred in relatively similar political contexts whether called
soft autocracies, competitive - authoritarian regimes or partial democracies.72
Contrary to other authoritarian countries such as Belarus or Uzbekistan, Serbia,
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have been characterized by partial forms of
democratic procedures and by their comparatively strong civil societies. In the
Caucasus region, Georgia had much more CSOs than its neighboring countries
( Armenia, Azerbaijan ).73 In the early 1990s, because of its mountainous land-
scape and protection afforded to the press and freedom of association,
Kyrgyzstan had been called “the Switzerland of Central Asia”, where, according
to USAID’s NGO sustainability index, since the early 1990s the NGO sector has
steadily expanded in the society. Second, in each case, “revolutionary” move-
ments did not intend to implement a fundamental change of the rules of the
political game. They rather criticized electoral fraud and corruption and aimed
to “defend the existing, democratic constitution.”74 A third common feature of
these revolutions is the importance of external and notably American commit-
ment in these political changes. According to Bunce and Wolchik, “there is clear
evidence that there was substantial U.S. involvement in all the successful cases,
both in the longer - term, such as investments in civil society, and in the short -
term, such as pressing incumbents to reform the electoral process and election
commissions and for improvements in the quality of campaigns, voter registra-
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tion and voter lists and the actual conduct of the elections.”75 Finally, these revo-
lutionary movements involved quite similar actors and strategies. According to
Kuzio, CSO, NGO, students’ organizations, young people and young women
participated more in revolutions “because they have less to lose”76 than other
actors whose careers or families could be threatened if they had joined the revo-
lutionary movement. 
The isolation of civil societies tends to be both a weakness and a strength. The
weak social integration of the NGO sector diminishes its capacity to mobilize
large social movements but, at the same time, the seclusion of civil societies
would favor a greater engagement of their members who fear less about their
personal situation. However, this could be true if the NGO sphere had not
become a profitable sector in itself. Abramson highlights the contradiction in the
fact that someone could be making a relatively high salary and receiving benefits
while working for a nonprofit organization.77 The more the country is closed
and the number of jobs in foreign companies is limited, the more careers in
NGOs are comparatively retributive. Contrary to what Kuzio argued, NGO
workers and democratization experts are not necessarily and inherently more
keen to join revolutionary movements than other people.
V. The survival of civil society : Transnationalizing contentious politics
According to Goldstone, “contentious collective action emerges through the
mobilization of individuals and groups to pursue certain goals, the framing of
purposes and tactics, and taking advantages of the opportunities for protest aris-
ing from shifts in the grievances, power, and vulnerability of various social
actors. But the form and outcome of that action is not determined by the condi-
tions of movement emergence.”78 Consequently, understanding the dynamics of
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the colour revolutions requires confronting the two variables Goldstone identi-
fies as key elements of contentious action : the valuation of the protest movement
by society and the type of State response to contentious actions. The former cor-
responds to the “cultural valuation”79 that individuals and groups throughout
society place on the protest movement. The latter refers to the nature of state’s
actions related to the protest movement. When the State fights mobilization only
through legal means and the protest movement takes place in a supportive envi-
ronment, social contentious actions are likely to take the shape of conventional
advocacy movements. When the State uses arbitrary repression to cut down the
protest, and if the social valuation of contentious action is rather negative, move-
ments are likely to disappear or stay underground. Table 2 tries to sum up the
different forms protest movements can take, according to these two variables.
Table 2 : Forms, sequences and outcomes of contentious action
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Goldstone made on the relation between the social valuation of protest movement and the
State response remained a descriptive one. We extended his analysis by incorporating
dynamic components such as the impacts of top - down and bottom - up external actions.
The preceding sections argued that international democracy promotion
actions have tended to focus progressively on realizing civil societies. However,
top - down mechanisms have not totally disappeared from the donors’ portfolio.
Although some funding agencies, private foundations and NGOs have been
more likely to adopt the civil society formula, political authorities and high - rank
diplomatic actors remain focused on political dialogue and keen to use political
conditionality mechanisms and top - down sanctions as means of democracy pro-
motion. Efficacy and actual outcomes of diplomatic sanctions have remained
highly debated issues in the academic and diplomatic spheres. Nevertheless, the
more they are universally adopted and well designed, the more they are likely to
play a role in the shaping of state responses toward popular protests. As we
argued earlier, civil society support programs have largely been planned as
“building NGO sectors from scratch.”80 However, it doesn’t mean that external
actors are inherently incapable of playing a role on the social valuation of protest
movements in foreign countries.81 As soon as international donors decide to
craft civil society programs accordingly to local social configurations and politi-
cal movements, international democracy promotion initiatives would be likely to
counterbalance the short - term focus of most aid and support positive valuations
of protest movements by societies.82 Drawing from these considerations, Table 2
incorporates both bottom - up and top - down strategies as critical factors for the
forms and outcomes of contentious action.
Colour revolutions’ processes can then be apprehended through successive
and particular combinations of top - down and bottom - up measures. In Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, top - down sanctions remained of high concern for rul-
ing leaders. These countries’ multi - vector foreign policies aimed at balancing
U.S. and Russian influences by maintaining good relations with Western multi-
lateral organizations and influential powers ( NATO, USA, European Union ).
This meant that Shevardnadze, Akayev and Kuchma could not ignore Western
pressure to accept foreign election monitoring missions and open up the politi-
cal sphere. If colour revolutions would certainly not have taken place without
electoral processes, external pressure contributed to limiting the extent of State
electoral manipulation and repression toward local activists. Referring to our
last model, one can say that top - down foreign initiatives partly prevented local
authorities from implementing strong and consistent repression towards demo-
cratic forces. 
External civil society support faces a paradox : the characteristics of local
labor unions, political parties or religious groups that are locally critical to civil
society are at the same time in opposition with basic values of the Western assis-
tance. The fact that the most important forces of civil society are not generally
part of programs labeled as civil society support has contributed to the depolar-
ization of political dissent nationwide. Both the sociological and ideological dis-
connection of civil societies from existing social networks has also played a role
in the perception shared by local populations, policy analysts and political lead-
ers that democratic movements are highly influenced by Western interests and
powers. They assume that the NGO sector and democracy activists are closer to
the Western countries in their approach than to local issues. However, civil soci-
eties cannot be limited to export products. They do produce specific effects,
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which have not been necessarily anticipated by international donors. So that
colour revolutions reflect probably less the success of the civil society formula
than the capacities of forces and actors to adapt it, exploit it or express them-
selves through it. The ousting of President Akayev during Kyrgyzstan’s “tulip rev-
olution” is much more linked with preexisting ethnic issues and ties between
informal youth groups to influential political and business elites than the direct
result of NGO advocacy actions. According to Khamidov, “that the youth were
instrumental during protests is clear. [...] Kyrgyzstan's Tulip revolution resulted
more from poorly coordinated events by an improvised alliance of powerful and
informal local elites than from well - planned and well - executed protests by a
cohesive opposition alliance. Because of disunity among the opposition groups
and the weaknesses of formal institutions, influential political leaders and busi-
ness elites chose to work with and channel resources for protests through their
informal patronage and local networks rather than through formal youth organi-
zations.”83 During protests held in Bishkek in November 2006 aimed at com-
pelling the new Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev to implement constitu-
tional changes, Khamidov also states that “the majority of protesters were tied to
influential leaders of the opposition through influential kinship or localism
ties.”84 The “tulip revolution” was then less a global democratic movement than
the replacement of a northern elite by more provincial ruling groups85 from
Southern Kyrgyzstan, which Justin Burke calls “the greenhouse of the revolu-
tion.”86 In Ukraine’s “orange revolution”, the cleavage between democratic
forces and conservative former elites seems less critical to the emergence of
protest movement than the divide between a pro - European western elite and the
pro - Russian eastern regions. The most critical element of these movements was
their capacity to use civil society and the rhetoric of democracy to their own end.
Conversely, the success of the civil society formula provided them with a favor-
able political opportunity structure, which can be easily used to increase mobi-
lization and raise capacities for collective action. Soon after the demonstrations,
which took place in Rangoon in September 2007, foreign commentators labeled
the monks’ uprising as the “saffron revolution”. However, Buddhist monks had
never benefited from foreign assistance, whether it be financial or “educa-
tional”. According to Burmese democracy activists exiled in Thailand and local
NGOs, civil society support played a very limited role in the democratic protest,
which had been largely a surprise for international donors involved in Burma -
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related activities.87 Similarly, Beissinger stresses, “the spread of democratic revo-
lution to the post - Soviet states was not predicted by most analysts.”88
Traditional revolutionary practices remain mainly domestic but colour revolu-
tions exist only in relation with each other. According to Beissinger, the power of
example has allowed “some groups that might be less structurally advantaged to
engage in successful action by riding the influence of the prior example to oth-
ers.”89 Despite different levels of Internet usage among countries and among
regions of the same country, the significance and potential of this electronic
medium has became a critical resource for the diffusion of successful scenarios
and methods. The worldwide diffusion of Gene Sharp’s books presenting non -
violent tactics of regime change, of videogames explaining how to bring down a
dictator and of individual blogs aiming to promote experience sharing among
activists contribute to shifting the foundations of democratic movements from a
domestic basis into a transnational virtual sphere.90 However, contrary to Claire
Wilkinson who considers colour revolutions as a “revenge of the clones”,91 they
were less standardized reproductions than local factors of contention expressed
in more global and “democratic” terms. Social movements in colour revolutions
are closed to the metaphor Deleuze elaborates on surf : a surfer does not surf as
if he was at the origin of an effort but part of a movement : “All the new sports –
surfing, windsurfing... – aim at fitting into a wave, which already exists. How to
be accepted into the movement of a great wave, an air column, ‘going in -
between’ instead of initiating the movement.”92 Youth and civil movements in
colour revolutions have turned from rigid and hierarchical Western - style organi-
zations in favor of new kinds of less structured “rhizomic” transnational move-
ments. Based on the conclusions drawn by Deleuze and Guattari in Mille
plateaux,93 one can then conceive colour revolutions as symbols of struggle
between a “nomadic war machine” constituted by transnational networks of
Civil Society Organizations and youth movements opposed to state apparatuses.
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VI. Conclusion : Hybridizing civil society
External promoters of civil society development often conceive civil society as
strictly demarcated from uncivil practices ( traditional, religious, political ones ).
Political theories have often seized the world, drawing lines and borders whose
values and geographical scales differ according to diverging heuristic systems :
politics vs. economics, civility vs. incivility. Limits or boundaries always convey a
change of nature : distinguishing a unit from any dissimilar entity amounts to
indicating both an end and a beginning. That is why these theories traditionally
and exclusively consider relations to otherness as a form of conquest or regula-
tion. 
The apparent dead - ends of the bottom - up programs did not make local activ -
ists and indigenous contentious dynamics disappear. If civil society development
alone did not stimulate any “revolutionary” movement, it channeled its orienta-
tion. Colour revolutions are characterized by a subtle balance between local
dynamics and international impulses. We argue that civil society programs did
not play a significant role in the initial stage of mobilization. There can even have
been negative factors in terms of social integration. That is not to say that they
were without use. In each of the “colour revolution” cases, the civil society for-
mula did not instigate contentious action but catalyzed preexisting social ten-
sions. Thus, the success of the civil society formula in “colour revolutions”
depends less on the intensity with which the NGO sector had been supported
than on the ability of local actors to relate previous contentious issues with dem-
ocratic elements. The diffusion of the civil society paradigm has not only influ-
enced the social expression of dissent. Local tensions, formal or informal
groups, have continued through the civil society formula and, at the same time,
they conversely give a proper and new meaning to it. Contrary to what it is gen-
erally asserted, the civil society formula does not work in weak societies but in
those that possess strong social relations, whether they be formal or not. Colour
revolutions have not taken place where local social forces were malleable but
where they were strong enough to reformulate the terms of the formula, to use
them and to surf the transnational wave of dissent.
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